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Challenges and Opportunities Facing Thailand in 2013

2012 is coming to an end. Soon, we will embrace what the New Year will bring. In foreign affairs, Thailand will, like in previous years, encounter a myriad of opportunities and challenges. This short article will identify key international events and ongoing domestic issues that could make an impact on the Thai foreign policy and the stature of the country on the global stage.

There are at least five events that require close attention on the part of the Yingluck Shinawatra government. Some of these events will generate serious consequences on national interests, and could possibly lead to a new round of mini-war with a neighbouring country.

First, it is likely that, in the middle of 2013, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will announce its ruling on the reinterpretation of the scope of ownership of Cambodia’s Preah Vihear Temple. The conflict between Thailand and Cambodia was mainly originated from persistent bickering within Thai domestic politics. Different political groups in Thailand had politicised the issue, sparking one of the most deadly armed clashes between the two countries in decades.

Partly as retaliation against Thailand’s continued politicisation of the issue, Cambodia sent the 1962 verdict on the Preah Vihear ownership back to ICJ to reinterpret. At the crux of the issue lies the troublesome 4.6 sq km piece of land adjacent to the Temple. Cambodia wants the ICJ to clearly declare that the disputed area also belongs to Cambodia. If this is the case, the new ruling could re-ignite a sense of anger and resentment among Thais against their fellow Cambodians. This would be unfortunate, considering that bilateral ties have greatly improved since Yingluck’s assumption of power.

Second, there will be just two years, from 2013 onwards, until the ASEAN Community building comes true. In Thailand, although several state agencies have awaken up to the new regional reality and the need to act promptly to ASEAN regionalisation, their policies and measures that will help Thailand catch up with this development are not in sync. In other words, there is a lack of a national policy in regards to how Thailand can participate effectively and meaningfully in the ASEAN process.

Since 2001, from the Thaksin to Yingluck administrations, ASEAN has been downplayed. Thaksin in particular paid a greater attention to his own overly-ambitious initiatives—some of these have proven to be unsustainable. And while Yingluck may seem to be active in foreign affairs, embarking on many globetrotting missions, she has no vision of how Thailand can take advantage from ASEAN community building. It is not too late for Yingluck to create a coherent ASEAN policy, given the fact that the public consciousness of ASEAN has risen in recent years.

Third, although no deadline to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) cooperative framework has been indicated, Thailand will soon need to make its decision. Four of its ASEAN fellows have already been members of the TPP, namely Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam and Malaysia. Earlier, Foreign Affairs Minister Surapong Towichukchaikul said, “The Thai government has to proceed according to Article 190 of the Constitution and other related processes before joining in the negotiations.” Meanwhile, the Trade Negotiation Department has begun its study on some potential positive and negative risks of concluding the PTT agreement.

It is true that Thailand may have to bear the consequences of expensive medicines and other disadvantages that come with the agreement. But the delay in decision making would place Thailand in an even more difficult position. It could put Thailand’s liberalisation process on hold. Furthermore, it could discourage the government from hurriedly improving financial and economic infrastructure to be in line with those in the international markets.

Fourth, the government must urgently clarify its position vis-à-vis the accession to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Some of Thailand’s Asian neighbours have recently become members of the ICC, such as the ratifications of the Philippines and Maldives. Setting aside the issue of whether the accession would be a political decision and whether this would be exploited as a revenge against any political groups in particular, it is a commitment which Thailand must show the world that it is willing to support the ICC to ensure that perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are held accountable.

Thailand, with its own unrelenting culture of impunity, should naturally welcome the ratification as a symbol of the state guaranteeing “human security” for its people.

Lastly, the coup of 2006 has long ended, but its political impacts have lived on and continue to damage the reputation of Thailand and its credibility among foreign investors. The Yingluck government cannot pretend that Thailand is without a serious, deep-rooted crisis. Contentious issues like constitutional amendment, the ratification of amnesty bill, the return of justice to those killed at Rachaprasong, and the reform of lèse-majesté law, continue to erode the country’s democratic image—if one believes that Thailand is still a democratic state.

Yingluck must make use of her electoral triumph and the ample popular support she has enjoyed, to untie those controversial issues, not just for the sake of her government’s stability, but for the respect Thailand well deserves as a responsible member of the international community.

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Pavin Chachavalpongpun is associate professor at Kyoto University’s Centre for Southeast Asian Studies.

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