The content in this page ("July 22 clash: thoughts on law, strategy and the referendum" by Somsak Jeamtheerasakun) is not produced by Prachatai staff. Prachatai merely provides a platform, and the opinions stated here do not necessarily reflect those of Prachatai.

July 22 clash: thoughts on law, strategy and the referendum

Law

 

1) The protest rally against Gen Prem Tinsulanonda at his residence is legitimate because a) a lot of evidence points to Prem's key role in the attempts to undermine the elected government and the Constitution which led to the Sept 19 coup, b) there is also circumstantial evidence that Prem had a key role in the coup d'état, and c) in several speeches since the coup Prem has openly been supportive of the junta. The last point alone justifies the call for Prem to quit as Privy Council president and statesman.

 

2) The order of the CNS and the government to obstruct all protest marches since the first one on March 18, to prevent demonstrators from reaching Prem's Si Sao Thewes residence, the deployment of hundreds of police troops, trucks and barricades along the route, dispersal of the protestors by force, are all illegitimate.

 

Prem is an ordinary man. His role before the coup, including his controversial remark that ‘the government is just a jockey' was political interference and is against the law. By any measure, the protest against him is legitimate. And there is no reason for the CNS and the government to put him above the law and beyond criticism as they have done.

 

3) The CNS and the government cannot cite the law and the rule of law to suppress the demonstrators, because the CNS and the government are themselves illegal entities, rebels who tore up the Constitution, subject to capital punishment. The demonstration to protest Prem as in (1) is part of the anti-coup effort. The junta has no legitimacy to cite the law in order to act against dissenters, since they are the ones who violate the law.

 

It does not mean that we should or could break the law in all cases by citing the illegitimacy of the government. But the issue of legality here is an administrative one: the means of acquiring power and resistance to that power. The junta, the offenders in this regard, have no right to cite the law to suppress those who do not accept its power. The claims that the demonstrators broke the law by damaging assets or assaulting police are simply avoiding the issue. The whole point is not the damage and assault, but a justified act of resistance to the administrative power acquired through illegal means.

 

In fact, it is legitimate, in principle, to resist dictatorial rule, such as fascism during WWII, by force, on the grounds that the junta was the first to use force in overthrowing democratic rule, tearing up the Constitution, and taking power. (The case of taxi driver Nuamthong Praiwan who killed himself by driving his car into a military tank is an example)

 

Of course, that is in principle. In reality, for the struggle to be successful, rather than unplanned and directionless, which would only prolong military rule, the means of resistance should be carefully considered. Therefore, strategic thinking and decision-making are important.

 

 

Strategy

 

4) All moves and means must be planned for the benefit of the resistance.

 

A good strategy is one that works to the advantage of the resistance, not the other way around. And any strategy whose benefit cannot be anticipated in advance is definitely not useful.

 

5) I suggest we analyze United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) rally at Prem's residence on Sunday July 22 as 3 successive acts rather than one:

 

5.1 the march to the residence to condemn Prem;

 

5.2 the determination to reach the destination despite police barricades;

 

5.3 the insistence on "No retreat until victory" or protesting through the night.

 

I think:

 

5.1 is feasible, and should be encouraged;

 

5.2 is "equivocal", depending on judgement, with no guarantee of the outcome. Personally, I think this can be done, but only with better preparation and execution. The way it went on Sunday was flawed;

 

5.3 is wrong in my opinion, and should not have been planned in the first place.

 

More elaboration:

 

6) The rallies to Si Sao Thewes to condemn Prem (5.1), starting from March 18, are useful as a publicity stunt to expose the coup masterminds hiding behind the false banner of being "apolitical", unmentionable and unaccountable. In my opinion, the exposure of Prem's involvement in the coup, starting from the "unconstitutional powerful figure(s)" controversy, is a crucial contribution to Thai political history in the long run.

 

The insistence on the right to protest and condemn Prem by marching to his residence (5.2) can be considered useful in exposing the ridiculous and unjustified effort to protect Prem as if he is above the law and untouchable. This can be deemed feasible (see point 8 below, however). If the rally succeeds in overcoming the obstacles to reach his residence, it will demonstrate that Prem is not untouchable, and his wrongful role before and after the coup will have to be accounted for.

 

However, in deciding this, better preparations should have been made on July 22. And violence and the image of violent demonstrations should be avoided at all cost. I think it would have been possible to pass through the barricades without violence, had preparations been better. For example, the hassle of removing the city garbage trucks blocking the route should have been avoided by having a specially assigned unit consisting of people who can control their emotions and truly understand the mission. And leaders must remind the demonstrators to leave the task to this unit.

 

But the most important point is why, upon reaching the residence, was the announcement made of "No retreat until victory"? (5.3)

 

No one would seriously expect Prem to resign immediately that night, if at all. So what is the use of vowing not to retreat? Staying overnight? What was the point?

 

Arriving in front of Prem's house and a peaceful dispersal afterwards would have been a major triumph. In fact, there should have been an announcement upon arrival, saying "Police and soldiers, do not panic. We are staying here for just a few hours. We came only to condemn Prem and demand his resignation". With such a gesture, we would have seemed more legitimate. (See point 7)

 

I am not sure the UDD leaders have actually reckoned in advance that they could stay overnight. If so, it was an error. A plan to go over the barricades to Prem's house was risky, as they could have clashed with the police. But to stay and condemn Prem overnight should not have been envisioned, as the UDD leaders such as Veera, Weng, and Jaran should have known better that Prem has always been "a wolf in sheep's clothing". Considering how careful the junta has been to protect Prem since the March 18 rally, why did the UDD think the junta and Prem would let them have their way? And what is the use of taking such risk? To abuse Prem for an extra 5-6 hours?

 

7) During the forced dispersal, the UDD leaders reacted contradictorily: on the one hand they taunted the police, "Come arrest us!", but on the other hand they resisted arrest and incited the crowd to resist, "Move on. Don't be afraid!" They still insisted on continuing the protest despite 3 attempts by the police to disperse them. I think they should have considered a retreat right after the first clash. In fact, if they had decided not to stay, they could have planned to calmly get arrested or walk away. Of course, this should have been communicated to the crowd beforehand so that everyone had the same understanding, and was prepared to react collectively.

 

However, when the UDD leaders' responded as they did, the dispersal led to the violent clashes. One fact that the cyber-supporters of the UDD seem not to realize is that among the many people who shed their blood, not one was a leader, and definitely not a single cyber-supporter. In most cases, those who get beaten and risk their lives are invariably ordinary people. Therefore, leaders must try to avoid clashes to the best of their ability by planning and choosing options that minimize the possibility of violence. Casualties are always ordinary people, including low-ranking police officers, not the leaders who nevertheless may possibly shine in parliamentary politics one day.

 

8) What really surprises me is what was behind the decision of rally as it happened (5.1-5.3)? I think the UDD leaders owe an explanation to the public, especially to the UDD supporters.

 

I have seen some attempts to explain this, though not from the UDD leaders themselves, but nothing really makes sense. One explanation is that this move was a response to Sondhi Limthongkun's rally in Lumpini Park on Sunday morning. If so, why did the UDD think of responding to Sondhi? And in this way? And even if there needs to be a response in the form of a march to Prem's house (5.1 and 5.2), why the "No retreat until victory" (5.3)? Marching and reaching Prem's house would suffice, wouldn't it? (It even can be argued that just marching (5.1) would suffice.)

 

Another argument goes intoa conspiracy theory: what was behind the UDD's decision this time was "revenge" by certain "elites" on other ruling "elites". (See http://palawat.com/article/20070723/102) This is just too far fetched.

 

I think the UDD must stop taking its supporters for granted, as if they will surely be committed to the cause. In fact, this has been a main drawback of the political movement that has been calling itself the "people's sector" after the downfall of the student movement during the 80s, including the May 1992 movement: the elitist mentality that regards the role of the people, even active people who work for the movement, as simply to support leaders' decisions, and that believes that there is no need to explain or debate what to do.

 

Referendum

 

9) What is particularly worrying about the UDD's move on July 22 is that it seems to have happened out of the blue. After the failed attempt to mobilize in June, the UDD seemed to focus on the constitution referendum on August 19. I do not think that between now and August 19 the UDD or any anti-coup group must limit their activities to the referendum. In fact, as in my previous writings, I have no faith or hope in the referendum and the "vote no" campaign. But since the UDD announced it would focus on the "vote no" campaign, it should have been clearly explained how any other activities are related to this campaign.

 

10) I am worried that the incident on July 22, which was to a certain extent of the UDD's own making (see 7 and 8) will complicate the "vote no" campaign. If we take a look at the Suan Dusit poll early this week (I do not suggest one should totally believe the polls), 55% of voters "accept" the draft charter, 15% "reject", and 30% are undecided. I think the incident on Sunday will only inspire this 30% to vote "yes" on the referendum rather than the other way around, in order to "avoid unrest", and to have a negative reaction to the UDD and the anti-coup movement campaigning to "vote no". I think that apart from those who are loyal to the anti-coup movement (15% as in the poll?), the July 22 incident hardly benefits the "vote no" campaign.

 

 

Written during July 22-25, 2007

 

 


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