Skip to main content

In a Thai Post interview published on 20 Sept, Kasian Techaphira of Thammasat University’s Political Science Faculty talks about the drastic changes in Thai politics over the last few years since the coup on 19 Sept 2006.  With the unprecedented phenomenon of two large mass movements rallying on the streets, he argues that these people need to be brought into formal politics as mass political parties, but this is not allowed under the existing political system; so a new political reform is needed to accommodate them.  However, the elite, frightened of mass movements and of the red shirts in particular, are not ready for reform, he says.

‘Thailand has come to the point where there are huge mass movements.  There was once a student movement, but it was created by or with the help of the Communist Party.  Now there are two movements, and there has never been anything like this before.  These two movements are not created by the bureaucracy, though [one of them has] some connections with it.  They created themselves: the yellows and the reds.’

In Kasian’s view, the bureaucracy does not feel comfortable with the existence of these two mass movements, as it is not in control.

‘The bureaucracy is not comfortable even with the yellows.  Look at the Sondhi assassination case; the suspects are all officers.  The Preah Vihear case is a headache for the military and the Foreign Ministry.  They can’t just give orders; otherwise they would already have done that.’

Although the yellow movement has allies among the bureaucrats, it is not their tool, as were the Red Gaurs or the Village Scouts [in the 1970s], he says.

Kasian’s idea is to bring these two movements into formal politics to become mass parties to avoid any further clashes on the streets, but Thai democracy has been ‘tamed, by design, under the control of the elite’, and ‘closed’ against mass politics or mass parties.

The strength of the bureaucracy itself has weakened.  And the way it is functioning now also adds to the problems as an ‘external power network’ has intervened to organize it.  ‘In good faith and out of love for the country and the main institution(s)’, the external power network has tried to salvage the bureaucratic system, after Thaksin tried to co-opt it.  That was a long fight between the two, and the old network eventually resorted to a coup.

The Thai elite are now ‘not in the mood’ for political reform to accommodate the two mass parties.  But the Thai elite were in the mood for reform in 1997 when royalists like Anand Panyarachun and Prawase Wasi were active in pushing for the draft 1997 charter which attempted to accommodate various forces in society.  These people have been quite silent lately, Kasian notices.

‘Royalists who are now active include Gen Prem Tinsulanond and Gen Surayud Chulanont, who are conservative and have no appetite for reform.  Instead, their inclination is to hold everything stable while the airplane is coming in to land, for fear that changes during the landing would make it a hard landing, not a soft landing.  So they want to make sure everything is stable at the very time the country is really in need of political reform.’

In contrast, Kasian sees people like Anand and Prawase as on the liberal wing of the royalists.  They played important roles in supporting the 1997 Constitution which, beyond anything they imagined, ended up setting the stage for Thaksin and the ‘Thaksin regime’.  These people were shocked.  Before the 2006 coup, they tried to bring Thaksin down without the collapse of the 1997 system, but the attempt failed.  ‘When the system collapsed, these people just went into paralysis,’ Kasian says.

Political reform does not mean just the 6 constitutional amendments being debated in Parliament.  The proposed 6 points, even if implemented, would probably settle certain issues between the executive and the legislature to some extent, and probably strengthen political parties, but these political parties are not mass parties, as they are owned by certain people.  ‘It will just be settling things among themselves: Newin, Abhisit, Suthep, or Banharn.  There’s no mass in there,’ Kasian argues.

The current political system with a weak coalition government is a product of the conservative royalists.  The ‘power network’ can manipulate a weak government from behind the scenes without having to take responsibility.  Kasian raises the standoff in appointing the new Police Chief as an example in point.  Abhisit as Prime Minister should have the power to make the decision, and be held accountable, but ‘now we have the situation where the external power network can paralyze the functioning of the political system.  And what is worse is that such an external force doesn’t have to be held accountable.’

On the reds

Kasian says that the red-shirt movement has been reluctant and inconsistent in its own positions: for example, whether it is for Thaksin or Democracy; for reform under the constitutional monarchy or for revolution.  

They swung to the left in April, very left and very far, but last month they submitted the petition to the King, swinging back and forth.  This is the incongruence between the mass movement and the Phuea Thai Party which is owned by certain people.  They have to think about this [to become a mass party].’

In response to the interviewer’s observation that many in the middle class, the media and academia do not accept the red shirts as a mass movement, but merely as Thaksin’s supporters, Kasian says,

‘That’s partly true.  Our job is not to deny that Thaksin is part of it.  We can criticize them if they go too far for Thaksin.  But it can’t be denied that they’re not all for Thaksin, though there’s a lot of admiration for him.  But the fact is this is a national mass movement.  It already exists, independently and not under the control of the bureaucracy.  And it has a political position different from that of the yellow shirts.  So there must be disputes and differences of opinion.  It’s not possible to force them to love each other and hold the same views.  But you have to find a way to allow them to have disputes without killing each other.  And the solution is to make them become mass parties in formal politics.’

‘And you can’t get rid of one colour, because you can conquer but you cannot rule,' Kasian says.

Quotes:

‘Chaiyan Ratchakul [of Chiang Mai University] says that this is not like 14 Oct 1973 where there was a group of students.   Now political awareness is widespread.  There’s no way to suppress it.  So open it!’

‘The Phuea Thai Party also wants to use the red shirts as a tool to reclaim state power, and then tell them to go home and let the party rule.  I don’t think that will happen.  The red shirts will never let that happen. […] The Phuea Thai Party has to change.  I can say that if the party does not change, the red shirts will set up their own new party.’

‘Thaksin is the cause of the yellow shirts.  The 2007 Constitution is the cause of the red shirts.  They already exist.  And we have to live with them.  They will never just disappear.  Stop imagining, or praying that there will be no more yellow or red.  We have to think how we will live with them.’

‘This chronic conflict is eroding other social values.  For example, doctors refuse to treat people of different colours. […] Things begin to deteriorate; relationships between teachers and students, doctors and patients, fathers and mothers, husbands and wives, you and me, to the point where society becomes dysfunctional.’

‘For example, the other day I listened to the parliamentary debate.  Some senators attacked the Thai Public Broadcasting Station for reporting on Thaksin investing on a diamond mine.  Thepchai Yong [Director of TPBS] stood up, and, instead of upholding the principles of journalism to report the facts, said that he thought the report would damage Thaksin.  This is no different from a doctor refusing to treat a patient.’

‘In the experience of many countries, smooth reform requires the elite to collaborate with the masses.  If the elite are excluded, you’ll face immense resistance.  And if the masses are excluded, you will protect your interests, but you get reform without change.  Useful reform needs to have the elite going hand in hand with the masses.’

‘Time is running out.  Power that commands unconditional acceptance does exist in Thai society, but this power is not likely to last very long.  I think if you are far-sighted, you’ll see that you need to adapt.  Now there’s a bottom-up movement calling for reform.  You don’t have to agree with all the demands.  You may think some are abhorrent or disagreeable, too rightist or leftist.  But we have to start the process to include them.’

‘I do not dream of a day when we can get rid of these influential parties with local influential mafia.  But we have to increase the space for mass-based parties, whether they’re yellow or red.  Even with external power, it’s impossible to dream of it just vanishing instantly.  But we have to think of how to decrease its space, and increase the space that is more transparent and accountable.’ 

Source
<p>http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2009/09/25895</p>
Prachatai English's Logo

Prachatai English is an independent, non-profit news outlet committed to covering underreported issues in Thailand, especially about democratization and human rights, despite pressure from the authorities. Your support will ensure that we stay a professional media source and be able to meet the challenges and deliver in-depth reporting.

• Simple steps to support Prachatai English

1. Bank transfer to account “โครงการหนังสือพิมพ์อินเทอร์เน็ต ประชาไท” or “Prachatai Online Newspaper” 091-0-21689-4, Krungthai Bank

2. Or, Transfer money via Paypal, to e-mail address: [email protected], please leave a comment on the transaction as “For Prachatai English”