The content in this page ("Nidhi Eawsriwong: Who are the yellow shirts and why have they come out?" by ) is not produced by Prachatai staff. Prachatai merely provides a platform, and the opinions stated here do not necessarily reflect those of Prachatai.

Nidhi Eawsriwong: Who are the yellow shirts and why have they come out?

Who are the yellow shirts? This question is hard to answer, but the scant information provided by economist Abhichart Sthitniramai and political scientist Anek Laothammathat of Thammasat University, shows that on average they have higher incomes than the red shirts.  There are more yellow shirts in the social security system, for example, meaning that they work in the formal sector.  Even though they may be just employees, they are ‘inside the system’, while the red shirts are probably working ‘outside the system’ as, for example, daily wage earners.

Nidhi assumes that the yellow shirts in general are from the middle and upper middle class, although he is well aware that there is a diversity of people in both yellow and red camps.

And we cannot assume that the leaders of both camps represent the masses.  The fact that so many people joined rallies for months and risked their lives on the street must result from social factors, rather than the rhetoric of the leaders on stage.

Why did the yellow shirts come out?  This is more difficult than the first question. Nidhi, though not so sure, tries to come up with the answers.

Although the yellow shirts have higher incomes than the red shirts, and our perception about them in general is that they are not poor, he thinks economic factors should be looked at first.  What has happened to the Thai economy during the past 10 years or so, which has made the middle of the middle classes, the ‘middle-middle class’, feel disenfranchised enough to take to the street?

Nidhi refers to Banyong Pongpanich’s research on inequalities in Thailand, and papers disseminated in a seminar entitled ‘Economic Reform for Social Justice’ held by the Thailand Development Research Institute in November last year.

Based on his own interpretation of the studies, as a non-economist, he has come up with some findings about the yellow shirts.     

How can one explain the yellow shirts in terms of inequality?

According to Banyong’s study, during the last decade or so, the salaries of the middle-middle class have not kept up with the growing profits of companies.

Returns on rentals and other income dropped drastically during the 1997 financial crisis, and did not recover until 2004 when they improved slightly, while returns on investments, which also dropped during the crisis, have continued to rise beyond pre-crisis levels.  Income from rentals has tended to decrease in comparison with income from capital investment, peaked at 24% of national income in 1998, and dropped to 7% in 2003.

Nidhi gathers that part of the income of the middle-middle class comes from rentals, including land, machinery, agricultural equipment, etc.  These people have less income, and surely feel the inequality.

Duanden Nikhomborirak and Sirikarn Lertamphainon of the TDRI have shown a concentration of income in the business sector in the past decade.  In 2000, the top 20% of businesses earned 81.02% of all income in the sector, and middle-sized businesses, which comprise 60% of the sector, earned 18.05%.  In 2008, the top 20% got 86.28%, while the 60% got 13.19%.

This is the reason why grocery shop owners and exporters of sandals to Russia have come out in yellow shirts, sitting in protests with the employees of computer companies and salesmen from petroleum companies, Nidhi says.

Niphon Puapongsakorn of the TDRI has pointed out that the Thaksin government’s policies of subsidizing agricultural production cost the state tens of billions of baht per year.  Farmers might have received some benefits from these policies—though not as much as traders and politicians—but consumers had to pay more, not to mention the waste of tax money.

Thaksin was attacked on issues sensitive to the middle-middle class, like interference in the media since the media is their most important political tool.  The skyrocketing price of shares in his business group affected their confidence in the stock market.  The so-called populist policies did not directly benefit them much.  They might have used the 30-baht health care scheme, but they gained nothing from the village funds, the assets-to-capital conversion scheme, or the SME Bank.

These economic factors have hurt the middle-middle class from the loss of security that they have been used to.

This is a kind of inequality.  However, it is not enough to explain in terms of economic inequality alone.

Nidhi thinks that cultural inequality explains the yellow shirts’ political behaviour better than economic inequality.

With a steady flow of consumer products which help define their identity, the income of salary people has not increased in proportion to the growth of profits from capital, so they could only gaze in despair at the latest products and the new identity they represent, knowing that these are beyond their reach.

This is the reason why many people have opted for the Sufficiency Economy, to apply to themselves as much as to others, particularly those who can easily access the newer and better products.  They agree with their leaders that the main culprits who know no sufficiency are evil politicians who should not be allowed to share more than 30% power.

These elected politicians do not need to know sufficiency, because they get money from corruption.  Although the middle-middle class are used to corruption, as in their daily lives they are always paying off traffic police, corruption by elected politicians hurts more.  Most yellow shirts are in the system, paying taxes directly, and should feel more pain than other citizens.

The Thai middle-middle class are less secure in life.  Their children’s education and their health care cost more.  And they have less access to loans in the formal sector than they had before the 1997 crisis. 

The populist policies were meant to win electoral votes and focused on the poor, rather than on distributing benefits to all classes.  So the security of life which the middle-middle class has got from the government is less than desirable.  The 30-baht healthcare scheme, for example, means that they are treated like other people who are mostly ‘lower’ than them, and questions about the standards of healthcare arise.  Likewise, the free basic 12-year education programme, without developing a uniform quality of schools, creates more competition for their children, who get mixed in with children from other classes.  Some of the middle-middle class shift their children to private schools or special programmes in public schools, but many of them just cannot afford it.

The biggest ladder for upward mobility for the middle class is education, but this has narrowed for the middle-middle class.

Equality is a democratic principle which the middle-middle class have long talked about.  In their reality, inequality is obvious when looking up.  The equality they have called for is equality with the upper middle class, the rich and the hi-so.  The equality which has been provided by the government in the past 10 years is for the lower middle class. The faces of these strangers who keep showing up seem more threatening than even the rich and hi-so.

So the principle of equality is unacceptable, as it is alien to Thai-ness.  For them there is no shame in rejecting equality outright.  What is called for is ‘order’.  The order which the middle-middle class call for is nothing more than hierarchy.  This is the reason why they are willing to identify their political movement with the monarchy.

And this is the reason why they adore Abhisit Vejjajiva, an Oxford graduate, eloquent in both English and Thai, born into an aristocrat family, and with an untarnished private life according to the values of the middle-middle class.  This represents the security of the order of a hierarchical society.

A very large part of security in the lives of Thais depends on their connections with relatives and friends.  This has changed for the middle-middle class, as the connections have weakened.  For the connections to work, they have to pay more, while their ability to pay has not increased proportionately.  Their lives have grown more frustrated as they have less security in life.

Calling them a ‘mob with connections’ [by Interior Minister Pol Gen Kovit Wattana during the Samak Sundaravej administration in reference to the yellow shirt clashes with police in October 2008 – Prachatai] is in accordance with what they yearn for.  With such connections, their rallies best reflect their bygone ideals, and become a warm, safe and secure place which they cannot find in real life. 

An older friend who joined the yellow shirts’ rallies almost every day said that the main point of what he heard in discussions among the yellow shirts during rallies was nostalgia for a past which would never return, especially social relationships, or the social hierarchy.  So they were concerned with the problems of children not listening to parents, students not obeying teachers, money mattering more than social status, the rich being able to do anything, even if they got rich through corruption, and greed spreading among the lower classes, leading them to sell their votes or becoming subject to the local mafia, etc.

All this boils down to moral decadence.  The only solution is to support good people to take over, and prevent the bad and immoral from holding power.  The old hierarchical social order should be restored, so that moral people could rule.

Traditionalism has become their fortress to protect themselves from the changes they cannot handle.

The person who tried to represent and push for change was Thaksin Shinawatra.  It was change on a large scale, and did not care for the middle-middle class.

It is no surprise that Thaksin is the target of the yellow shirts, no matter what hidden agenda the leaders might have had.  His name alone is enough to represent all the undesirable changes occurring among the middle-middle class.  So Thaksin must get out and never ever return.

Will this nostalgia to escape the future remain with them forever? Nidhi thinks it will not, as the changes from outside Thailand are too powerful for anyone to resist.  With or without Thaksin, they eventually will have to face inevitable changes.

The middle-middle and lower middle class are great forces in current Thai society, but due to the political, social and cultural systems, they lack proper organization despite their struggle to take a role in society.

So it is easy for both groups to fall political victims of those with vested interests.

Originally published in Matichon: http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1278919534&grpid&catid=02

Source: 
<p>http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2010/07/30301</p>

Since 2007, Prachatai English has been covering underreported issues in Thailand, especially about democratization and human rights, despite the risk and pressure from the law and the authorities. However, with only 2 full-time reporters and increasing annual operating costs, keeping our work going is a challenge. Your support will ensure we stay a professional media source and be able to expand our team to meet the challenges and deliver timely and in-depth reporting.

• Simple steps to support Prachatai English

1. Bank transfer to account “โครงการหนังสือพิมพ์อินเทอร์เน็ต ประชาไท” or “Prachatai Online Newspaper” 091-0-21689-4, Krungthai Bank

2. Or, Transfer money via Paypal, to e-mail address: [email protected], please leave a comment on the transaction as “For Prachatai English”