Federico Ferrara is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Department of Asian and International Studies at the City University of Hong Kong. He is the author of "Thailand Unhinged: The Death of Thai-Style Democracy" (2011), described as a "expose that offers a no-apologies, scathing critique of Thai society and politics in post-Thaksin Thailand." His research speaks to political transitions and democratic reform across Southeast Asia.

As with his scholarship, which confronts some of Thailand's most pressing and controversial issues, here Federico speaks candidly of Thailand's future political prospects. A difficult road to restorative justice and reconciliation lies ahead, given the events of April/May 2010; Federico suggests that amnesties for the perpetrators may well move Thailand forward. Prachatai met with him earlier this week, in Singapore.

What do you feel are the future prospects for reconciliation in Thailand?

FF: I think the long-term prospects are very positive… This option of sitting at a table, and essentially deciding between elite players and constituencies to resolve these issues through the democratic process - this is the only option that guarantees some electoral stability. My hope is that… once, they've exhausted all other opportunities, it's likely that they'll do the right thing, eventually.

One (other) alternative is that there is some kind of compromise that is reached, that essentially allows the country to democratize. I think, in medium to long-term, the prospects for this… are rather good. This is the only option that guarantees stability.

For the old establishment to continue to repress people, I don't think, if anything, it's practical. The people are beyond it.

If only to guarantee stability…?

FF: Yes. Any other system, such as the dictatorship of the elite establishment, obviously would have the opposition of at least half the country; judging by the election results, there isn't any appetite for that… This more Burma-like regime is not a stable arrangement.

And this Thaksin ruling, as an aspiring dictator, in a sense - or going back to how business was done before - we've seen this is not stable. We've seen there's a lot of opposition, rightfully so, to that.

What do you see as the conditions for greater consensus between these different factions and groups?

FF: The conditions are, to get a lot of the key players involved in the process… The military is unlikely to see this kind of democratization process, which likely involves them giving up a lot of their goodies, and a lot of their power, in very positive terms… You try to make them as irrelevant as you can - you also perhaps promise them something of value.

…Such as?

FF: In democratic transitions in places such as Argentina and Chile, for example, one of the stumbling blocks was that the military wanted to retain power, and it was fearful that if it gave up power, then a lot of skeletons in their closet would come out. So the deal that was made in those places was immunity - amnesty - and large budgets.

This is a kind of arrangement that would make a lot of people very upset on the red-shirt side. But, depending on what you get in return for that promise, it might be worth considering. It might be an effective way to move things forward.

We've seen in places like Argentina and Chile, that some of these old military people have been neutralized, now they're being arrested, 27-28 years after democratization in Argentina, 20 years after in Chile… The difference between this and what Thailand has seen before, is that the purpose for which the amnesty was used. Argentina and Chile used this to get democracy. It's another thing to use the amnesty and then you don't get democracy - as is the case in all previous examples, in Thailand.

The military can only be rendered irrelevant if all political forces essentially agree that they're not ever going to allow this unelected institution to get into power.

It's rather ironic, then - that if the Yingluck Government were to negotiate with the military, to render them less relevant in their tradition form, with amnesties, for example - ironically, this would remain a discussion between establishment groups. Which, in a shift towards a democratic transition, doesn't sound especially democratic.

FF: Yes, but that's not a unique thing. One thing you want to avoid is a revolution, which might sound like a romantic idea… But you wouldn't want to have Libya in Bangkok.

It depends on what is offered in return for an amnesty. If Yingluck or her brother use this as a bargaining chip for Thaksin to be able to return to the Prime Minister's office, then that's not a good thing. But if that incentive of an amnesty is used to initiate meaningful reform, then it's worth exploring as it has worked in other (countries).

Speaking of the amnesty proposal, Thailand is currently in the middle of a reconciliation process. I'm trying to imagine how this amnesty offer would seem to those red-shirts fighting for justice, those still in jail…

FF: The only way in which you should offer amnesty to the military is in return for democracy. In return to freedom of expression (and) a release of political prisoners.

Is it possible that, this approach would prove contradictory to the principles of restorative justice? By which I mean, this idea that you find those responsible for the 'shoot to kill' orders, bring them to justice… hence the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission, akin to those in other countries. Or is that approach simply not feasible, given Thailand's political climate?

FF: Obviously, that would be preferable, that everyone who violated human rights, all those that killed people, be held to account. The question is: can the country actually move forward, if this government tries to really 'take on' these institutions? The answer is, probably no. Unless they're able, through some sleight of hand, to change the balance of power within the military… But that's far-fetched.

There are two priorities. You want to honor in some ways the memory of those who got killed, and you don't want to sell them out. At the same time, you want the country to move on, and honor those ideals without getting any more people killed. And so, in a sense, these amnesty arrangements might be one way (to do so).

You're going to make a lot of people upset. These are ugly deals. But politics is the art of the possible. You cannot plunge the country into civil war simply, on principle… It's the nature of compromise, to give up something of value.

As I understand it, in order to bring about amnesties, you need to find those responsible first, in order to know who to give amnesties to. At this point, however, we don't know who shot people, who gave 'shoot to kill' orders. So how might that work?

FF: Thailand has given blanket amnesties, before. You give it to everybody - you say 'everything that happened between day X and day Y'…

… Effectively 'drawing a line in the sand'?

FF: It doesn't mean that you give assurances, presumably written, with regards to amnesties, that the investigations should have to stop. The investigations can and should continue. This is likely to be a likely sticking point. People are not willing to give up the positions which currently shield them from prosecution if they think that the moment they do so, they end up in jail.

At the same time, Thailand has an enormous, ingrained level of impunity… So therefore, some may question their need for such an amnesty, given this lack of accountability.

FF: Exactly. The implicit threat there is that they don't play along, they will be held to account, and told that their position isn't especially safe…

The election victory of Pheu Thai has been so overwhelming, in a sense, that it's very hard to overturn the election results in any other way than a military coup. This means that they've taken away many of the cards that they could play. Even the judicial system, is completely discredited - so even that, the judicial coup card - is basically gone.

The question is: is it credible, that every time things don't go your way, that you threaten a military coup? If this happens again, it could have catastrophic consequences - that the backlash against it could be major. So the government has some room, a mandate…

The (military) may have immunity now, but protecting it may generate some ugliness. They could stage a coup, there being a backlash against it, and then what happens? So in that sense, the military have an incentive to figure out some arrangement.

Accepting a reduced political role for immunity from prosecution, and also, perhaps a large budget… might be a way forward. Of course, I feel bad about this amnesty for such Generals. I'm just concerned about what comes next. If you look at it less emotionally, then perhaps, this is one of the bargaining chips."