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On the morning of 10th March, as I stood at the Lanzhou University Square, Gansu province in south-west China, what was noticeable was a steady stream of ochre and red robed Tibetan monks boarding buses out to Xiahe. This flurry of activity did not seem unusual, given the proximity of Gannan Tibetan prefecture (area), renowned as "Small Tibet" with Xiahe county ( district) the seat of the famous Labrang Lamasery. The day - 10th March is also significant, marking the 49th anniversary of Tibetan National Uprising. On surface, there was quiet and nothing seemed amiss. The demonstrations and protests that unfolded belied the frenzy under the seamless surface. What was unusual to note was that not only were many Chinese citizens aware of the situation within, but also well-informed. There was frantic smsing of updates in Lhasa and elsewhere. In the days that followed, the adventerous were circumventing blocked websites via anomizers, reading up and assimilating what the outside world had to say. China has an estimated 150 million net users and 400 million cellphone users, not to mention a post-socialist youthful population, hungry for information. Clearly, China's tryst with open door has come of age, and more is in store.

While China's teeming millions are testing the limits, exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the XIV Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso has virtually truncated and effortlesslessly checkmated China in what appears to be China's annus horribilis. Given the backdrop of elections in Taiwan and Olympics on anvil, the high-profile publicity blietzkrieg by Tibetans in exile was not entirely unexpected . For the estimated 130,000 Tibetans in exile world wide (0.01 percent of the world's estimated 13 million Tibetans), the turn of events in China appears to be inevitable. Thus far, the Dalai Lama and his supporters have leveraged the events and tapped into global networks and political friends to place the the plight of displaced Tibetans under the scanner .

The Tibet issue, both critics and sympathizers will agree is no longer an innocent one - with battle lines drawn by different players with diverse agendas. The background to this impasse is six rounds of dialogue between the Tibet Government in Exile (TGIE) and the Chinese government ( which commenced since 2002 ) and which appear to be going nowhere. Both parties have conflicting historical claims over Tibet's status - China claims that Tibet has been a part of China since the Yuan dynasty, 13th century. China also refers to the "Agreement of the Central Peoples Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the peaceful Liberation of Tibet" on 23rd May 1951. Tibetans dispute this and claim was signed under duress and maintain that Tibet has been an independent entity in history. Though both have in principle agreed to put this on the backburner in an attempt at a negotiated settlement at this ethno-territorial conflict, there does not seem to be a meeting point.

Other grievances have been piling up. These include the bitter acrimony relating to the house arrest since 1995 of the 11th Panchen Lama recognized by the Dalai Lama - Gendhun Choekyi Nyima, who willl turn 19 this April. China recognises Gylatsen Norbu as the Panchen Lama, whom Tibetans dismiss as the "fake" Panchen Lama. There has been the controversial Chinese technological marvel - US $ 3.16 billion dollar 1,118 km pan-Himalayan railway linking Golmud, in Qinghai province (also claimed by Tibetans as part of their original Tibet) to Lhasa, in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), which commenced operations in 2006 - as well as the US $20 million highway from Tingri County, TAR to the northeren base camp of Mount Everest in 2007. Both have been opposed by Tibetans on grounds of cultural and environmental damage. Tibetans have accused China of cultural genocide and demographic annihilation - and claim these have been built to facilitate the migration of Han Chinese, overwhelming and swamping them in their own homeland.

China has also been mum about the Dalai Lama's public wish make a pilgrimage to his homeland in his lifetime. China tested the waters in 2006 - in what some suggest was a mock drill - by spreading the rumour of the Dalai Lama's return to his birthplace. According to reports, almost 10,000 Tibetans converged on Kumbum Monastery, a pilgrimage site 17 miles south-west of Xining (in the erstwhile Amdo region which is also claimed by Tibetans as part of their original Tibet), which is the birthplace of Dalai Lama, and now in Qinghai province - a sign that the Dalai Lama is still very popular and revered, and China understandably realizing that his return would draws crowds and attention, and potential unrest. There has also been the controversial September 2006 shooting by China's Peoples Armed Police (PAP) on a group of 70 Tibetans fleeing from TAR through the Nangpa La Pass in Nepal, killing a 17 year old nun, Kelsang Namtso. Denials by China that this was in self-defence backfired as the shooting was captured on camera by a Romanian mountain climber and cameraman, Sergiu Matei and aired all over the world. It is estimated that about 3,000 Tibetans flee through the Nepal route every year. They are initially housed at the UNHCR-run Transit Centre in Nepal, prior to asylum / temporary visitation in India. China regards crossing the border a criminal act.

Today the Dalai Lama and the TGIE are headquartered in Dharamsala, 500 kms away from India's capital, New Delhi, in the foothills of Himalayas in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. The community, since the Dalai Lam's arrival in1959 into exile, has become highly structured. Dharamsala today houses the Central Tibetan Administration(CTA) which comprises of the Assembly of Tibetan Deputies (Parliament) with the Kashag ( Cabinet) headed by the Kalon Tripa, the Prime Minister, Samdhong Rinpoche. A Charter (Constitution) has been adopted since 1991.

The Dalai Lama, the Head of the State of "Tibet" has since given up the claim for independence from China and espouses the 'middle way' and calls for " respect ( to) the distinctive character of the Tibetan people, thereby making it possible for the Tibetan people to enjoy genuine regional autonomy" . The demand is for genuine autonomy in cultural, religious, economic, environmental and educational affairs for Cholka-Sum or Greater Tibet. He has also articulated that the entire regions of present-day TAR (also called U-Tsang) and the neighbouring regions of Amdo and Kham (which the CHinese have moved into other Chinese provinces) - and area of almost 2.5 million square kilometers - be combined into one TIbetan entity. He contends that these historically constituted Greater Tibet before Chinese occupation integrated Amdo and Kham into neighbouring Sichuan, Ningxia Gansu and Qinghai provinces. In other words, the argument is that the bulk of Tibet lies outside of what constitutes the present day TAR. Increasingly the emphasis has moved to protection of culture within a "Tibetan cultural zone". More recently in 2007, Lyodi Gyari , the Special Envoy articulated the Dalai Lama's stance that there should be a "single administration" for the Tibetan people inside China so that their "unique way of life, tradition, and religion can be more effectively and peacefully maintained".

Critics and the Chinese government on the other hand, have accused émigré Tibetans of clinging onto and propogating a 'Shangri-La' myth - they point to a backward and feudal society. They have also slammed accusations of demographic annihilation of 1.2 million Tibetans during Chinese occupation as exaggeration. Political scientist Barry Sautman recently dismissed "special repression "of Tibetans as a myth. China argues that most of the shine in Tibet Autonomous Region is because of heavy subsidies from the Chinese government. Some of the Dalai Lama's friendships have been mired in controversy, such as with former Nazi storm trooper and SS official, Heinrich Harrer, whose seven years in Tibet was made into a film.

China also perceives the Dalai Lama's stance changing as vacillation. The Dalai Lama has moved from his 1987 Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet which articulated the demand for "transformation of Tibet into a zone of peace and called for respect for fundamental rights and democratic freedoms", to the Strasbourg Proposal of 1988 which demanded "a self governing democratic political entity, with the Government of Tibet responsible for developing and maintaining relations, through its own Foreign Affairs Bureau, in the fields of religion, commerce, education,culture, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities", and that" Tibet shoud join international organisations concerned with such activities and that the Government should be founded on a constitution of basic law" to the current "Middle Way" which strives for creation of a political entity comprising the three traditional provinces of Tibet, and such an entity shoud enjoy the status of genuine national regional autonomy". China is also ill at ease with the political role that he adorns in addition to his claim of being the spiritual leader. This coupled with the ingeneous abilility of Tibetans network and harvest political capital at all costs has not gone down well.

Perhaps it is time for both parties for introspection. The Dalai Lama has been flexible and his policy has evolved. In exile, the challenges of an exile community continue to grow bigger. While the Tibetan refugees in India have been one " the most successful refugee communities in the world" , as Kunchok Tsundue points out ( based on the Tibetan Demographic Survey, 1998) the effective literacy rate of the Tibetan exile population in India stood at 74.5 percent in 1998, but only only 2.6 percent of the total population achieved higher studies with professional careers. What is a cause for concern is that and most Tibetans cannot be possibly absorbed into the Central Tibetan Administration, the CTA and consequently are engaged in low paying careers. The community has a high proportion of non-workers placed at an estimated 74.1 percent . The declining Total Fertility Rate of 1.22 is also cause for alarm. It is also time for the exile community to revamp the system of education which inculcates and imparts traditional education but fails to economically empower the younger generation, although the Dalai Lama has exhorted and encouraged Tibetans to learn Mandarin seriously. Perhaps more worrisome is that the movement has been - despite elections, in the shadow of the Dalai Lama.The future course will on the second rung of leadership. Clearly, the question is " After the Dalai Lama - Who?".

The Chinese government on the other hand have been the proverbial ostriches in the sand, biding time in the negotiations, hoping that the movement would fade away after the Dalai Lama. It has been trying to play its cards right by "keeping" the dialogue alive - however, by subtly dragging its feet, in anticipation that the Dalai Lama's demise will ease the process of finding a solution is off the mark. After years of denouncing the Dalai Lama, it has placed itself in a tight corner dismissive of a "splittist" Dalai Lama.Marginalising the Dalai Lama whose moral authority stands undiminished is counter-productive, as is linking recognition of Taiwan (by the Dalai Lama as part of China) as one of the primary conditions to resolving to the Tibetan issue. China's recent step to engage with the Dalai Lama's aides is therefore welcome. For China, negotiating with a younger, more radical generation of Tibetans, many of whom have grown up in exile could be more difficult. They, unlike the first generation of exiles, are far more educated and more in sync with global discourse on democracy and human rights, and savvier in the use of modern tools like the internet to spread their side of the story and elicit support from around the world.

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