Somsak Jeamtheerasakul’s analysis and observations of the current situation.  Translated and shortened by Prachatai English.

The government’s use of force to crack down on the red shirts at Rajprasong now seems practically inevitable, as does the collision course taken by Thaksin and the red-shirt leaders, including the possible use of the black-clad men who are the latter’s secret weapons.

Those on the government side who push for the use of force with no compromise include the elite and hardliners in the Democrat Party such as Chuan, Banyat and Korn.  Abhisit and Suthep, though initially slightly less hardline than those people, have increasingly accepted their approach.

A key figure on the government side who appears the least hardline turns out to be, ironically, Army Chief Gen Anupong, who has suggested the government consider the option of a House dissolution and political solutions.

However, Anupong cannot keep dragging his feet about the dispersal, and probably has to go on with the planning, though at a slower pace than would satisfy the hardliners or Abhisit and Suthep.

The alleged ‘plot against the monarchy’ is not only meant to create a pretext for suppression in the manner of 6 Oct 1976, but also to put pressure on people like Anupong to act against a subversive movement.

The reason why Anupong has been such a drag on the government’s use of force has nothing to do with him being a good person or not, but is due to the current Thai political power structure; that is, it is now no longer possible for the military to seize power and lead the government, unlike what happened before 14 Oct 1973 or even in 1992.  So the military will only be a tool for and a force behind the government.  Even if the military succeeds in dispersing the red shirts by the use of force, it still cannot hold power.  But it will be damned if it fails.  (For the same reason, Anupong did not dare to seize power, although he was urged to do so by the PAD, in the wake of the 7 Oct 2008 incident.)

Thaksin and hardline red-shirt leaders, in particular Jatuporn, have decided to take a collision course because for them there is nothing to lose.  Casualties are not included in their calculations anyway.

The black-clad men almost definitely belong to Thaksin and the hardline red-shirt leaders, considering the fact that they attacked only government troops.  The bombings at various places could have been done by this group to destabilize the situation.

The bombing at Silom could also have been done by this group, not by the government, as the government would have immediately followed up with further steps.

The decision to go for a head-on collision by Thaksin and red-shirt leaders has been consciously made as they know what they will collide with.  Thaksin now has no reason for restraint, after his failed attempts to compromise.

A Thai E-news article, published days before the 10 April clash, suggested that Thaksin well knew that this rally would finally be squashed, but he had a deeper goal, which was to unmask the persons who were behind the government, dragging them out in the open so that the red shirts would be disillusioned, even more than in Oct 2008, in the hope that someone would come out.

In Somsak’s view, such analysis is somewhat overstated, but not too far fetched.

Thaksin and the red-shirt leaders know who they will collide with.  Jatuporn has talked about a lady called J.J., and Visa Khanthap has said on stage that ‘from an inside source, Abhisit said during a Cabinet meeting that Piya Malakul had told him that a supreme elder forbade a House dissolution’ (Matichon, 26 April).

This shows that the red-shirt leaders are aware that the demand for a House dissolution will never be met, but they still let clashes happen in acts of defiance against someone.

The move recently made by Gen Chavalit and Somchai must have been initiated by Thaksin.  Chavalit might have been relatively independent, but Somchai will never do anything without consent being given by Thaksin.  It was meant either to put pressure on someone or show a way out at the last minute, in the hope that someone would bypass another someone and his acolytes.  With no response, a collision course is the way to go for Thaksin and the red-shirt leaders.

At this moment, what is most ironical is that maybe only a ‘miracle’ can prevent bloodshed at the last minute, because there are no other factors which have the power to force the hardliners on both sides to step back.

Somsak, however, believes that the ‘miracle’ does not function anymore.

There is no doubt that the ‘miracle’ is on the government side, but if it’s still functional, there is a small chance that both sides can take a step back.

Since the collapse of the leftist movement in 1980s, the movements that claim to fight for democracy and the rights of the people have always been led by people with few democratic credentials.  This has been true since May 1992, in particular, until now.